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This paper explores the relationship between salary dispersion in the National 
Basketball Association (NBA) and team performance. Team performance will be 
measured by regular season win totals as well as playoff performance. I hypothesize that 
teams with higher salary dispersion typically perform better because of superstars in the 
NBA. Superstars are more effective in basketball than in any other sport because of rules 
inherent to the game. They also create high salary dispersions on their respective teams, 
and being superstars, they contribute largely to team success. This study will encompass 
all 30 NBA teams over the past 20 NBA seasons, 1995-96 to 2015-16.  
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The National Basketball Association (NBA) is widely regarded as the top 
basketball league in the world. It consists of 30 teams, 29 of which in the United States, 
with 1 team in Canada (Toronto Raptors). The league was created as the Basketball 
Association of America (BAA) in 1946, but later adopted the National Basketball 
Association name after merging with the National Basketball League (NBL) in 1949. 
Teams consist of 15 players with 12 of which being active and able to play at all times.   
 Collective bargaining agreements (CBA) are a contract between the NBA and the 
NBA players’ association (NBAPA) that help shape the schematics of player contracts, 
revenue distribution, and trades, among many other things. Over the years collective 
bargaining agreements have affected salary dispersion on NBA teams. With the 
introduction of the “max contract” players can take anywhere from 25-35% of a team’s 
salary cap. Having two max contract type players will result in a small amount of cap 
remaining for the other 13 members of the roster. This is certainly a strategy currently 
used by many General Managers in the effort to create a “super team”. A super team 
consists of traditionally 3 or more stars that overshadow the rest of their teammates. 
Recent examples of super teams include, the 2007-2012 Boston Celtics, 2011-2014 
Miami Heat, 2015-2017 Cleveland Cavaliers, and the 2014-2017 Golden State Warriors. 
There are several recent championship-winning teams that wouldn’t traditionally be 
considered super teams, such as the 2004 Detroit Pistons, 2011 Dallas Mavericks, and 
2014 San Antonio Spurs. Super teams tend to have higher salary dispersion, in that there 
is a greater variance between the top end players and bottom end players. Super teams 
	 4	
have become more common in recent decades. In the 1950’s and 60’s Bill Russell led the 
Boston Celtics to 11 championships in 13 years and often battled Wilt Chamberlain’s 
Lakers. This era of basketball was characterized by this rivalry, but these still don’t 
classify as super teams.  
 The National Basketball Association (NBA) consists of 82 game seasons. 
Collective bargaining agreements over the years have created salary caps in which teams 
cannot exceed without paying a severe luxury task. Team salary’s can be dispersed 
between a couple superstars or several journeymen. If we can conclude which is the 
better option, we will have a better tool for executives to use when negotiating contracts. 
Looking at the current literature there seems to be a disagreement between the effects of 
salary dispersion on team success. An extension to the literature would be the effects of 
salary dispersion on playoff success. Team success can be measure by regular season 
win-loss records; however, I would argue that playoff success is more important to teams. 
With this paper we will investigate the relation between salary dispersion and win-loss 
records and playoff performances for teams in the NBA over 20 years.  
 
2. Background 
2.1 Collective Bargaining Agreements 
 There have been a total of 11 collective bargaining agreements in the NBA. These 
are some of the important highlights to follow: The 1970 collective bargaining agreement 
was the first for the NBA. This specific agreement increased minimum salaries for the 
lowest paid players in the league. The 1976 CBA succeeded in merging the NBA and 
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ABA, as well as added limited free agency for players. The 1983 CBA added “Bird 
Rights” for teams (famously named after Larry Bird) in order to help teams better retain 
their current players (Coon, 2012). The 1988 CBA introduced unrestricted free agency, in 
which players could join any team in the league following the completion of their signed 
contracts. This was a large redistribution of power from the owners to the players, as 
players could leverage other teams offers against their current team in an effort to get 
paid more. The 1995 CBA introduced rookie scale contracts, which gave a set value of 
money to each draft pick, respectively going forward. For example, the first pick of the 
NBA draft would make $2 million, while the second would be set at $1.75 million, and 
so on. The 1999 CBA is widely considered to be the most prominent agreement between 
the players and owners in NBA history. This agreement introduced max salaries, which 
“corrected the skewness of the NBA’s salary distribution” (Hill et. al, 142). Hill and 
Groothuis argue that the 1999 CBA redistributed wealth from the superstars to the 
median players and lower tier players, something that future CBA’s will counteract. The 
1999 CBA also introduced the luxury tax, in an effort to end the 1998-99 NBA season 
lockout. A luxury tax is an expensive option to go above the soft salary cap in order to 
retain players, resulting in a substantial tax. Cleveland Cavaliers owner “Gilbert paid $82 
million in salaries and $7 million in luxury tax in 2014-15. Last season, Gilbert paid $107 
million in salaries and $54 million in luxury tax. Currently, the Cavs are committed to 
$127.6 million and $27 million in luxury taxes for this season” (NBA.com). LeBron 
James, the current best player in the world, wouldn’t sign with the Cavs until Dan Gilbert 
assured him that luxury tax spending wouldn’t be a problem. Often, teams must dive deep 
into the luxury tax bracket in order to pay the talent necessary to win NBA 
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championships, as the Cavs won the 2015-16 championship. Given the Economic 
Recession in 2007-2008, the owners proposed a severe decrease in NBA player’s revenue 
sharing from 57 percent of league revenue available for contracts to only 40 percent. 
Evidently, this did not go smoothly with the NBA players and led to a substantial lockout 
in the 2010-11 season. The recent 2016 CBA will be highlighted further in the next 
section.  
“In their infancy, professional sports unions struggled to escape the stranglehold 
of monopolistic power that owners exerted through the reserve system”(Hill & Jolly, 
344). However, with the introduction of free agency, players were freer to pursue large 
contracts with other teams or their own teams by threatening to leave unless paid more. 
Unions struggled with the competitive bidding and drastic salary differences stemming 
from vastly different player productivity levels. Traditional unions for non-sport settings 
often introduce collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) that reduce productivity 
oriented wage inequities, and instead replace them with seniority differentials. Through 
the course of several CBAs, the NBA has attempted to follow the path of non-sport 
unions, by rewarding veteran players with larger contracts, whilst simultaneously 
reducing the level of differentiation that can exist based on the productivity of players.  
   
2.2 Special Maxing 
A new collective bargaining agreement in December of 2016 created a new 
concept of “special maxing” a player in which they can account for 35% of a team’s cap 
space. With the 2016-2017 salary cap limit being $94.14 million, this would equate to 
over 30 million dollars per special max player. This new clause is known as the “Kevin 
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Durant Rule” because of the offseason before the 2016-2017 season. For reference, the 
Golden State Warriors have been the best team in the NBA since the 2014 season. In the 
2015-16 season, the Golden State Warriors, led by MVP Stephen Curry finished the 
regular season with a 73-9 record. This is the best regular season record of all time, 
rivaled only by Michael Jordan’s 95-96 Chicago Bulls who finished 72-10. Kevin Durant 
was the Most Valuable Player (MVP) in the 14’-15’ season and is still widely considered 
to be a top-three player in the NBA. Following the historic 73-win season by the Golden 
State Warriors, Kevin Durant decided to join their ranks. This is quite possibly the 
greatest example of a super team ever created. The outrage by NBA owners and 
executives, following this free agency acquisition led the league to the Kevin Durant 
Rule, where teams can pay players that they had originally drafted more than other teams. 
The players who are special max eligible must have been selected to an all-NBA team the 
season prior, or won Most Valuable Player (MVP) or Defensive Player of the Year 
(DPOY) in one of the previous two seasons.  
 Consequences from the new CBA are already starting to show; most notably from 
the Sacramento Kings. The Kings traded their superstar DeMarcus Cousins to the New 
Orleans Pelicans for a cheaper player on a rookie contract, as well as a draft pick. Before 
the new CBA, this deal would have made no sense (and some argue it still doesn’t), 
however, the Kings traded Cousins to avoid paying his new “super-max deal”. Cousins 
was an all-NBA caliber player in his contract year, thus making him eligible for the new 
super-max deal created in this most recent collective bargaining agreement. This super-
max would’ve cost the Kings $207 million over five years to keep DeMarcus. This 
implied that DeMarcus would have taken up 35% of his team’s salary cap. Not even 
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LeBron James, the best player in the world for the last decade, has exceeded 30% of his 
team’s cap. This unprecedented contract forced the Kings to trade DeMarcus for pennies 
on the dollar, and it is implied that other teams might do this with their stars as well 
moving forward. If teams issue these super-maxes, then salary dispersion will climb 
higher than ever before, yet might not contribute to winning as much as prior years. It is 
one thing to have three all-star players dominate a salary cap, but if only two players take 
upwards of 70% of the salary cap up, then there is very little wiggle room to fill the rest 
of the roster with serviceable players. This will be a problem for the NBA moving 
forward, as it has profound effects on salary dispersion and the cohesion theory.  
  
2.3 Play style 
Play style has changed dramatically over the past two decades as well. In 1995-
1996, big men like Hakeem Olajuwon, Shaquille O’Neal, and David Robinson dominated 
the game from inside the paint. These players were impossible to guard near the hoop, 
resulting in ridiculous stat-lines of 30 points, 15 rebounds, and 5 assists each game. 
Michael Jordan also dominated the game during this era, as his isolation shooting kept 
him head and shoulders above all other players. NBA players became great when they 
could shoot a contested two-pointer consistently. However, with the growing obsession 
with the three-point line, these types of players are becoming fazed out of stardom. Three 
point attempts have increased steadily over the past two decades. In the 1995 season there 
was a league-wide average of 5.9 three-pointers attempted per game, however, the 2016 
season averages 9.6 three-point attempts per game (basketball reference). This is a huge 
shift in play style, as the game is moving from inside to outside. Perimeter play or half 
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court play is much more common than posting up near the basket in today’s game. This 
makes sense if we calculate the expected value of each shot. Suppose there is a player 
who shoots 40% from the three-point line (this is considered a good shooter). Their 
expected value for every three-pointer attempted is 1.2 points. That is equivalent to a 
60% shooter from inside the arc (where all attempts are worth two points). Three-pointers 
can often be wide-open shots, while twos are often contested by defenders, making a 
three-point attempt a much more viable shot. This shift in NBA play has given rise to a 
new breed of players, called sharpshooters. Stephen Curry is the most notable shooter in 
the NBA and he is considered a superstar. He is still on a cheaper contract because he re-
signed while injured; yet he has won the last two MVP awards.  
 This shift in play style has created a wave of over-inflated contracts for one-
dimensional players. Often, great three-point shooters focus the majority of their practice 
time shooting. This seems obvious, but it makes them liabilities on defense and in other 
aspects of offense, leading to hindering performances, in an effort to excel in the one 
category NBA teams are emphasizing. This overpayment of sharpshooter contracts has 
led to salaries being eaten up by this type of player, when in reality, teams need 
rebounders and other players with good intangibles that help make winning plays. With 
teams paying substantial salaries to one-dimensional sharpshooters, we see teams having 
trouble filling their roster with players of necessary skillsets. Salary dispersion is 
inherently effected by these overpayments, as it will create a larger dispersion if an entire 




3. Literature Review 
3.1 Parity 
The NBA is historically the league with the least amount of parity of the four 
major sports. “Exploring Interleague Parity in North America: The NBA Anomaly” by 
Duane W. Rockerbie explores this phenomenon. Parity is important for the NBA because 
of the importance of unpredictability to fans, and therefore advertisers as well. The 
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis suggests the perfect mix of unpredictability and 
predictability will maximize profits and league-popularity. Thirty owners and a 
commissioner is a sort of “joint venture” headed by the current commissioner, Adam 
Silver. All four major sports leagues in North America use some sort of revenue sharing, 
indicating that competitive balance is an important aspect of these leagues.  
The NBA anomaly signifies that the league has had much less parity than the 
other three major sports leagues over the past three decades. “Despite this empirical fact, 
the NBA has experienced an impressive increase in revenues over the last three decades, 
from an estimated US$843 million in 1990 to an estimated US$3.68 billion in 2011, 
resulting in an average annual growth rate of 15.3%” (Rockerbie, 290). The NBA has 
never truly focused on parity, but instead intentionally promoted superstar players in key 
rivalry matchups. This paper argues that this lack of parity is actually inherent to the 
game of basketball. This is a caveat of the high number of scoring attempts per game in 
basketball, eliminating the significance of random occurrences that are frequent 
throughout basketball games. Given eighty-two games in an NBA regular season, teams’ 
records are fairly close to their “true record”. Scoring attempts are much less frequent in 
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the other three sports leagues. Scoring attempts are also difficult to define in Football and 
Baseball.  
 Another explanation for the NBA anomaly is the “superstar effect”, where a 
superstar will have a greater effect on their team in the NBA than any other sports league. 
This is due to the few amount of NBA players on an active roster compared to other 
leagues. “An NBA team is allowed only 12 players on its roster, in comparison to the 23 
players in the NHL, 25 players in MLB, and 53 players in the NFL” (Rockerbie, 300). 
This allows for individual players to have a greater effect on their teams than superstars 
in other leagues. Given the limited number of superstar players in the NBA, their effect is 
even more impactful. LeBron James, who may be the most iconic superstar of this 
generation, has been to the previous seven NBA finals. LeBron has won four out of the 
last eight Most Valuable Player (MVP) Awards, signifying that superstars truly carry 
their teams to contention in the NBA.  
Through an econometric analysis, Hausman and Leonard discovered that TV 
ratings are much higher in NBA games that feature at least one superstar. Therefore, they 
generate a large amount of revenue for the league, and their respective teams. Superstar 
effects are not to be underestimated, as they have a large amount of sway on television 
audiences. “The 1993 NBA Finals, which featured Michael Jordan, averaged a 17.9 
Nielsen television rating. The 1994 Finals, however, averaged only a 12.2 rating despite 
the presence of the New York Knicks, a team playing in the largest Nielsen market” 
(Hausman & Leonard, 1997, 586). Michael Jordan’s first game back from retirement in 
1995 captured 11% of all US households televisions, which was the highest rated regular 
season game in 20 years. Companies, in which Michael was the spokesman for, saw large 
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increases in their stock prices after his return announcement, including McDonalds and 
Nike. The authors found that a player such as Michael Jordan can have positive effects on 
the revenues of other teams, by making the league more popular as a whole. Hausman 
and Leonard (1997) estimate that Michael Jordan is worth more than $50 million to other 
teams in the league (600).  
 
3.2 Salary Dispersion 
The paper, “A game-level analysis of salary dispersion and team performance in 
the national basketball association” by Hajime Katayamaa and Hudan Nuch uses game-
level panel data in their research. In professional sports, teams pay their players salaries. 
Some sports will pay their players relatively equally, while other sports have a high 
percentage of salary focused on a few star players. “Given a fixed payroll budget, it is 
unclear which salary structure leads to better team performance: is it a more disperse or a 
more compressed structure”(Katayamaa & Nuch, 1193)? Akerlof and Yellen (1988) 
argue that compressed and even salary structure leads to “harmony and cohesion” among 
teammates, thus increasing productivity. The tournament theory, however, suggests 
greater salary dispersion incentivizes players to exert more effort and increases 
productivity. This study uses individual game outcomes as well as regular season win-
loss records. They found that salary dispersion has no causal effect on performance, 
regardless of the level of dispersion. This indicates that players do not care or care little 
about the salaries of their NBA teammates. This game-level analysis conclusion directly 
coincides with their season-level findings as well. This is directly contradictory to 
instances within the NBA. There have been numerous instances of NBA players unhappy 
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with their salary, given the compensation of other players as their frame of reference. For 
example, Timofey Mozgov was a critical rim-protector for the Cleveland Cavaliers in the 
14-15’ NBA season; however, he became a relative non-factor in the 15-16’ season, due 
to performance issues. The Cavs were already paying 72% of their salary cap to LeBron 
James, Kevin Love, and Kyrie Irving. This high-level salary dispersion between the “Big 
3” and the rest of the Cavs pushed Timofey Mozgov to the Los Angeles Lakers for a 4 
year, 64 million dollar deal. This is a clear example of high instances of salary dispersion 
leading to teams losing talent. Although their conclusion of salary dispersion having little 
effect on team performance may be correct, I claim their assumption that players care 
little about the salaries of their teammates to be wrong.   
 This study of employment can be extended to the NBA. If players are underpaid, 
do they underperform? Or do they exert more effort in an attempt to receive higher 
compensation? Of course, the NBA is much different than a typical occupation, however, 
some of these factors can play into NBA player productivity.  
 The wage-effort hypothesis can support or oppose the team cohesion theory in 
basketball. If players are all paid the same amount, then there is no one to compare wages 
with, resulting in workers/players being content with their salaries. This might create 
divide, however, where better players feel that they aren’t paid a fair value for their level 
of productivity, which could possibly lower their performance in the long-run. This level 
of inefficiency could be evidence towards the tournament theory in the NBA, where a 
greater level of salary dispersion will increase performance because players will try to 
earn larger salaries. Also, salaries are more upward/downward mobile than other careers, 
given the volatility of production levels from players yearly. A player could be a star one-
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year, but have a dramatic reduction in production the next year. This salary mobility can 
increase productivity by incentivizing players to exert more effort consistently.  
There are instances when recently promoted workers/players show a decrease in 
productivity. This can be explained by luck contributing to their promotion, thus 
regressing to the mean following their promotion. This is called the Peter Principle, and 
this paper uses NBA data to empirically test this. The Peter Principle states that, 
“…everybody is promoted to his or her level of incompetence”(Dilger, 2003, 1). One 
explanation for this phenomenon is moral hazard, which is when employees exert more 
effort in order to get promoted, yet plan on lowering their effort and productivity once 
they’re promoted. Another excuse for this principle is the expectation of less effort given 
a promotion. “The promotion to a position with less work is then a reward for past effort 
and serves as an incentive for lower and younger employees to work hard for the same. It 
is a soft form of retirement” (Dilger, 2003, 1).  This soft-retirement incentivizes younger 
employees to work harder for years, so that they may enjoy a decreased workload paired 
with higher pay later on.   
Studies on the effects of player mobility, as well as sports market size on salary 
earnings are prominent in this field of research as well. This study by Lee, Leonard, and 
Jeon measured pay and performance in the NBA from 1991-2008. “This study recognizes 
basketball as an offensive and defensive team sport while considering each individual 
player rather than individual teams as the unit of observation. And thus no team-level 
effects such as number of team wins are considered in this study”(Lee et. al, 2009, 2). 
This paper differentiates itself from others by (1) studying the capacity of the local 
market to hold more teams or not, and (2) frequency of players movements between 
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teams. They concluded that scoring ability was the largest determinant in a player’s 
salary. They also determined that rebounds and assists and blocks all have their own 
specific values in terms of contract values, as they are weighed differently. Players that 
move more were found to have a lesser salary and often less talent. If a team is found to 
compete with other local teams in the sports market then they typically have lower 
salaries. 
This paper contributes significantly to previous literature, however, it has some 
downfalls, most notably, their conclusion on local sports markets. Sports markets that 
have a lot of local competition, i.e. Los Angeles, New York, Dallas, typically offer some 
of the largest salaries in the four major sports leagues. Los Angeles has two local NBA 
teams, the Clippers and Lakers, yet they both are almost always in the luxury tax bracket.  
Koch and Nafziger employ a moral hazard model to determine the trade-off 
between incentive provision and inefficient job assignments. Workers are often 
incentivized through promotions; however, sometimes they are better suited for their 
current position. They argue that there is a job distortion in promotion decisions, mainly 
derived from employees being better suited for their previous position, over their 
promoted position. However, demotions are rare in any work environment, but employers 
theoretically should demote a worker if they’re not well suited for that position. “Put 
differently, why do some employees rise to their level of incompetence and then remain 
at that hierarchy level, a phenomenon known as the Peter Principle” (Koch & Nafziger, 
2007, 2). The authors argue that employees towards the bottom of the skill spectrum who 
get promoted, will be worse off in their promoted position, due to the severe amount of 
additional effort required for them in the new position.  
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 Tangents can be drawn to the NBA where a team will offer a large role and 
contract to a player not deserving of it, leading to a feeling of failure and inadequacy for 
the player. Another route for the Peter Principle would be a player getting paid 
substantial money compared to previous contracts, yet decreasing productivity because 
they are contracted at that price regardless. There have been many cases in the NBA of 
“lazy players” who dropped off after receiving large contracts. The safety of these multi-
year deals allows recently signed players to take it easy. 
 
3.3 Cohesion Theory 
Cohesion theory states that the less disperse wages are, the more productive the 
workers of a firm will be. Levine’s (1991) argues: “The fundamental hypothesis of this 
paper is that a firm with large wage dispersion will have a less cohesive work groups.” 
He claims that firms who consider cohesiveness will have a more homogenous wage 
structure, while firms that don’t value cohesiveness will often have more disperse wages. 
He also believes firms who have a high skilled work force, which often results in higher 
wages for those workers, will trickle down to a small increase in wages for less skilled 
workers, in order to maintain some level of cohesion. Furthermore, the outcome will not 
be Pareto Optimal because low workers are getting paid more, resulting in less bottom-
tier workers getting hired, due to the wage increase fostered by the high-skilled workers. 
Levine defines cohesion as, “the propensity to obey group norms because approval of the 
group is valued”.  
Levine’s models incorporate reservation wages as a means of garnishing 
cohesiveness. If a firm meets a workers reservation wage at its bottom line, then they will 
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work, yet maybe not at their full potential. If a firm pays a worker more than their 
reservation wage, there should be an increase in cohesion, as well as obedience to the 
firm’s goals. There is a fine balance, however, between nurturing this cohesion and not 
overpaying for low-end labor. “In this model, the firm increases the wages to L workers 
until the marginal benefit of greater in cohesiveness just balances the cost of higher 
wages” (Levine 1991). Levine also concludes that increasing low-end wages will increase 
efficiency. Levine argues that a “perfectly egalitarian policy is the most productive” for 
the firm itself, however, it must be mentioned that this hurts high skilled laborers, who’s 
salaries are being stretched towards the mean in an effort to increase lower skilled 
laborers cohesion. This study emphasizes wage dispersion as a main factor in 
productivity.  
Workers have a perception of fair wage, and when actual wage is less than fair 
wage, it results in workers exerting less effort corresponding to that difference in fair and 
actual wage. This helps explain the existence of unemployment, particularly when the fair 
wage surpasses the value of the market-clearing wage. This results in a negative 
correlation between skill and unemployment. “The motivation for the fair wage-effort 
hypothesis is a simple observation concerning human behavior: when people do not get 
what they deserve, they try to get even”(Akerlof & Yellen, 1990, 256). 
Breunig finds a negative correlation between wage inequality and performance in 
major league baseball.  He “derives the probability of a team winning as a function of the 
effort of all players on both teams using a contest success function (CSF), which is useful 
in holding all other factors equal. The CSF is ideal because it has the “property of equi-
proportionate changes in effort across teams leaving the probability of each team winning 
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unchanged”. This allows the authors to solely find the impact of wage inequality on 
performance, whilst not being affected by other variables and metrics.  
Often firms have to worry about what their workers will think from certain firm-
level decisions or actions. Milgrom and Roberts (1988) argue that firms can adjust wages 
in a manner, such that employees are no longer influenced by non-fiscal decisions made 
by firms.  Therefore, “they would then be indifferent among the various decisions the 
organization might take, and they would have no reason not to cooperate fully in 
promoting the organization's objectives” (Milgrom and Roberts, s158). Applying this to 
basketball could deter teammates from locker room trouble because players wouldn’t be 
concerned with the coming and going of players. As long as pay was compact, players 
would have no reason to garner hate for any decision made by the organization, thus 
creating a firm sense of cohesion.  
Superstars in sports are becoming more important. They sell tickets, merchandise, 
and contribute significantly to winning. For example, on the last day of Kobe Bryant’s 
career on the Los Angeles Lakers, the team sold $1.2 million worth of Kobe merchandise 
in their arena (NBA.com). Superstars often require the highest salary on the team, 
however “on the back of escalating salary dispersion within an organization, intra-
organization salary disparity may undermine group cohesion by creating feelings of 
inequity, thus generating destructive reactions that can impair team performance” (Tao, 
et. al, 2015, 152). Both Lazear (1989) and Levine (1991) argue that small salary 
dispersions will reduce dissonance between players, thus improving cohesiveness and 
productivity. This contradicts the tournament theory, in which employees or players are 
incentivized to perform, given the high levels of salary dispersion and earning potential. 
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The paper Compensation and performance in Major League Baseball: Evidence from 
salary dispersion and team performance (Tao et. al 2015) looks into the divisiveness of 
authors in their empirical research supporting either the cohesiveness theory or 
tournament theory and supplies their own empirical evidence with Major League 
Baseball (MLB). Looking into the conclusions of this study, as well as the key 
differences between the NBA and MLB, will give further insight into my hypothesis.  
 It is important to note in panel data collection, that teams with the same payroll in 
different years often have a substantial difference to the average MLB payroll in that 
specific year. For example, the 1998 Montreal Expos (Currently Washington Nationals) 
had a payroll of US$371,240, which was only 23% of the average MLB payroll that year, 
while the 1986 Oakland Athletics had a similar payroll of US$376,776, which accounted 
for 81% of an average MLB payroll (Tao et al, 153). This clarification is crucial to make 
if the data is to be unbiased. The authors use payroll level as a control variable as well as 
replacing level with a team’s relative position in payroll in the MLB in that given year as 
another control variable. This, paired with comparing the results at an absolute and 
relative level give key insights into the effects of salary dispersion in baseball. The 
“dynamic panel method suggests that compensation does play a role in team 
performance. In terms of salary dispersion, its negative effect on team performance turns 
somewhat weaker when a team's relative payroll position variable replaces the payroll 
level variable” (Tao, et al, 154). Therefore, this study on baseball supports the team 
cohesion theory as opposed to the tournament theory, which I hypothesize isn’t the case 
in basketball.  
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3.4 Tournament Theory 
The main reason for this dichotomy between baseball and NBA salary structure is 
inherent to the rules of each sport. Baseball teams consist of more players and positions, 
resulting in a lessened impact from superstar players. In the NBA, only 5 players are on 
the court for each team, resulting in a greater impact felt from each player, particularly 
superstars. Baseball also can have star players only play once every fortnight if they are 
pitchers. MLB teams have 5-man starting pitching rotations and a star pitcher will only 
play in approximately 30 out of a total 128 games in a season. This lessens the effect of a 
superstar pitcher, despite demanding a large salary nonetheless. In the NBA, superstar 
players play every game, barring injury, and often 40 minutes out of all 48 minutes 
available per game. This paired with the high number of games in a season, suggests that 
basketball should support the tournament theory.  
Through studying the hierarchy of Audit Firms in Taiwan, Yang, Yang, and Su 
sought the relationship between the salary gap in different structures and firms’ operating 
performances. “The empirical results are consistent with the tournament theory and show 
that the salary differences in different hierarchies are statistically and positively related to 
the operating performance” (Yang et. al, 2015, 15). Employees are incentivized by the 
salary gap to increase productivity in aspiration of a promotion and salary increase. The 
salary gap increases at each level, i.e. bigger difference between head auditor and vice 
head auditor, than vice head auditor and assistant auditor, and so on. Therefore, the 
incentive to increase productivity and performance increases at every subsequent level. 
This firm’s hierarchy, supported by the tournament theory, creates a large effort boost in 
their employees.  
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 The same argument can be made for the NBA, where young or cheap players will 
be incentivized to increase their productivity in exchange for a large pay increase. If 
every player is incentivized to make as much money as the salary cap allows, then the 
team will consist of solely maximum effort players. If there were not a salary cap, like 
baseball, then the incentives would be even more dramatic. No salary cap would 
incentivize the superstars in the NBA to play with maximum effort in order to capture 
their highest market value, as opposed to highest allowed value because of the salary cap 
restrictions.  
 It is evident that superstars dominate the sport of basketball. They justifiably 
demand the largest salaries because of their contribution to the revenue growth of the 
NBA. Their specific teams also benefit dramatically, as Jerseys and other team gear with 
the superstar players name are sold feverishly. Teams with superstars are also more often 
nationally televised, as well as sell more tickets because of that one player. Although 
these players are not fairly compensated due to their salary cap hindrances, they are 
almost always at the very top of the available pay scale. I hypothesize that this semi-god 
celebrity status enjoyed by superstar players, incentivizes younger or worse players to 
increase performance in order to reach this stardom. However, most successful NBA 
teams have a couple stars at least, indicating that teams with greater salary dispersion will 
perform better consistently.  
 Ramaswamy and Rowthorn find a positive correlation between wage disparity 
and performance, but do not attribute it to the tournament theory. They argue, “wage 
dispersion emerges as a consequence of the heterogeneity in the production structures of 
firms” (Ramaswamy et. al, 512). This is because workers will get paid more if their job is 
	 22	
more susceptible to damage, while lower skilled workers are placed with relatively safer 
jobs for the firm. For example, a person handling incredibly confidential and important 
information will be paid more than a person who handles public and less important 
information.  
 Lazear and Rosen (1981) argue that paying a worker for their rank or position can 
prove more fruitful than paying someone directly for their performance. This incentivizes 
young workers or in this papers case, players, to attempt to reach the rank of their 
superiors. Basketball players are all technically the same rank, however, this can be 
applied to years of service in the NBA. The NBA already does something along this line, 
where 5-7 year veterans can earn a larger max contract than rookies, while 7-9 year 
veterans can earn even more than the 5-7 year players, and so on. This loose definition of 
ranking within the NBA supports the tournament theory, as it incentivizes young players 
to produce in an effort to reach later stages of their career. “For example, the large 
salaries of executives may provide incentives for all individuals in the firm who, with 
hard labor, may win one of the coveted top positions” (Lazear and Rosen, 841). 
 Sherwin Rosen goes one step further from his earlier paper with Lazear and 
introduces the idea of high-end incentivizing. “Elevating the top prizes effectively makes 
the ladder appear longer for higher ranking contestants, and in the limit of making it 
appear of unbounded length: no matter how far one has climbed, there is always the same 
length to go” (Rosen, 711). Rosen argues, by incentivizing top-end players or workers 
they will strive to reach these prizes or feats, while simultaneously incentivizing younger 
workers to increase productivity in an effort to catch up or reach the top themselves. This 
is directly relatable to basketball as every player grows up watching superstars in the 
	 23	
NBA and once in the league themselves; these players continue to grow in an attempt to 
catch their one-time hero or idol. The countless endorsements and fame also incentivize 
the younger players to strive for greatness. Rosen’s ideas also apply to players at the very 
top in ways other than monetary. Basketball greats are constantly compared to one 
another throughout the eras. LeBron James may be the greatest player in the world right 
now, whilst earning as much as he possibly can through salaries and endorsements. 
However, he keeps pushing himself farther because he is chasing the greats. Michael 
Jordan is considered the best basketball player of all time and LeBron is constantly in his 
shadow, therefore incentivizing him to increase his performance in an effort to transcend 
Jordan’s legacy.  
 
3.5 Lack of Correlation 
 In the heated debate between whether cohesion or tournament theory is the 
supporting theory of performance, there is an entire fleet of authors who found no 
correlation at all between the two. This is the third and final explanation between wage 
dispersion and performance. If cohesion theory supports condensed wages, and 
tournament theory supports stretched out wages, the final option would be for salary 
dispersion not to matter in the first place. Therefore, it is important to include literature 
that found the correlation to be inconclusive as that is one of the three main prongs.  
 Berri and Jewel (2004) found no correlation between winning performance and 
salary dispersion. In fact, “these results suggest that only two factors matter in terms of 
team wins: quality of players and quality of coaching” (Berri and Jewel, 2004). They 
mention that because of the lack of correlation between salary dispersion and team 
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performance, authors should instead focus on the relationship between salary dispersion 
and individual player performance, as it might tell more.  
 
4. Analytical Framework 
The purpose of this paper is to test salary dispersion in the NBA and see if 1) 
there is an effect, and 2) if aforementioned effect supports the cohesion theory or the 
tournament theory. Therefore, my performance metric must be my dependent variable, 
while salary dispersion is my main independent variable. Cohesion theory states that 
players will be more productive if their salaries are more homogenous, creating an 
additional sense of chemistry, whilst eliminating jealousy from the equation. Cohesion 
theory argues that this constant envy of teammates salaries will only lead to worse 
performance. Tournament theory argues the opposite; that a more disperse salary will 
incentivize players towards the bottom of the payroll to play better, in order to reach that 
upper echelon of salary some of their teammates get to experience. It is worth noting that 
the minimum salary for a non-rookie in the 2017-18 NBA season is $815,615 
(NBA.com). Clearly tournament theory might have a somewhat different effect in the 
NBA than in other industries due to the large salary figures even at the very bottom of the 
league, however, maybe it is even more incentive to live the “superstar lifestyle” only 
available through endorsements and $30 million contracts.  
There is a divide in the literature, sports and non-sports authors alike, to the 
support of cohesion theory versus tournament theory. Lazear (1989), Levine (1991), 
Akerlof and Yellen (1988 and 1990), and Milgrom and Roberts (1988) all find results 
supporting the team cohesion theory; arguing that less disperse salaries will increase 
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cohesion, thus increasing productivity. Sometimes authors find different results in 
different mediums, as Lazear and Rosen (1981) find evidence to support the tournament 
theory. Rosen (1986) also finds more empirical evidence in support of the tournament 
theory in addition to his previous work with Lazear. Ramaswamy and Rowthhorn (1991) 
also argue that an increase in wage disparity will improve productivity and firm 
performance.  
 The divide between theories becomes evident, the further this study goes, 
therefore I will attempt to use 20 years of NBA data in order to find support for one of 
these theories. I believe my research will support tournament theory, as fewer players are 
necessary to carry a team to success than in other sports, by rules inherent to the game. 
My addition to the literature is my time frame; using 20 NBA seasons, compared to the 
nearest paper, which uses 10, as well as the inclusion of playoff performance as a 
productivity metric. Playoff performance is when performance matters most, and 
therefore should be included in any study that measures performance in sports, I argue. 
With a combined interdisciplinary approach through labor economics and basketball, we 
should have a solid foundation to build our model.  
 
5. Data and Variables 
The salaries used in this paper were retrieved from (P. Bender) and listed by the 
15 players on each NBA roster per year. Each year’s salary per team was imported into 
Microsoft Excel and variance and standard deviation were calculated in turn from then. 
Because of this massive panel data set, there should be interesting trends found between 
the mid 90s and mid 2010s. The variables for performance were retrieved from 
	 26	
“basketballreference.com.” This website listed the win totals for every team in any given 
year, as well as playoff results for the applicable teams.  
The variable for performance is created from a few components. The NBA season 
has 82 games every year, and for each win earned in any given year, it adds 1 to their 
“final score”. For example if a team wins 50 out of their 82 total games in a given year, 
then that 50 would be part of their final score for that year. The other component to the 
performance variable is playoff success. If a team doesn’t make the playoffs then nothing 
is added to their final score, aside from regular season wins. If a team makes the playoffs, 
then their success within the playoffs will affect their final score in different ways. If a 
team makes the postseason and loses in the first round, they will not be awarded any 
additional points to their final score, in an effort to balance the difference between 
Eastern and Western Conferences in the NBA. Sometimes the 8th seed (bottom seed of 
playoffs) is drastically different between the Eastern and Western Conference. Therefore, 
if a team is going to be awarded playoff performance points, then they must win a round 
of 7 in the playoffs (all series are a best of 7 games). If a team makes it to the second 
round of the playoffs, also known as the conference semi-finals and loses, then they will 
receive an additional 10 points. If a team makes the conference finals and loses, then 20 
points will be given to their final score. If a team loses in the NBA finals, they will 
receive 30 points tallied onto their final score, while a championship team will receive 
40. For example, the 2014-15 Chicago Bulls won 50 games out of the possible 82, as well 
as lost in the second round of the playoffs. Therefore, their final score of team 
performance in that given year is 60. Theoretically the highest score a team could receive 
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is 122, with a perfect 82-0 record and a championship, but the highest score used in this 
paper is the 1995-96 Chicago Bulls, led by Michael Jordan, with a score of 112.  
The main independent variable in this paper is salary dispersion. This is 
calculated between the 15 NBA players on each roster in any given year. Standard 
deviation will be the measurement of salary dispersion, with higher standard deviation 
representing higher salary dispersion and vice versa.  
A dummy variable will be instituted for the 1998-99 season as well as the 2011-
12 season for their respective lockouts. The 1998-99 season consisted of 50 games, while 
the 2011-12 season had 66 games. This dummy variable will account for the lack of 
regular season wins present, due to the lockouts.  
The salary cap independent variable was created as a means to protect against the 
ever-increasing salary cap and its relation to dispersion. In the 1995-96 NBA season the 
salary cap was only $23 million, while the last year of my data set, 2015-16 had a $70 
million salary cap. The number continues to go up exponentially, given new TV deals 
and collective bargaining. The salary cap for this current NBA season, 2016-17 is a 
whopping $94 million. This salary didn’t uniformly increase, however, as some years had 
no salary growth, due to lockout discussions or other reasons, while others, like this past 
year have exploded onto the scene. This independent variable for salary cap should 
account for the ever-changing salary cap and not allow it to distract from the true 







The econometric model used in my paper is as follows: 









The final score metric I have created is the sole dependent variable being used in 
this study. Salary dispersion is the main independent variable in my paper. I argue that 
salary dispersion will have a profound effect on team performance, supporting the 
tournament theory because a more disperse salary indicates the presence of stars 
deserving of those large contracts, and stars are essential to win in the NBA. However, 
there is the complication of massive, bloated contracts for undeserving players that stay 
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on a team’s book for a few years. This can heavily skew my results away from my 
prediction. For example, Joe Johnson received a 6- year $119 million contract from the 
Atlanta Hawks in 2010. He never approached anywhere near that value of production and 
was traded because of it to worse teams with more salary space, such as the Brooklyn 
Nets. It could be possible that large, yet unjustified contracts, such as Joe Johnson could 
muddy the waters of large contracts being reserved for star players. 
Multicolinearity robustness checks must be run in order to see if there exists a 
strong connection between the two variables, as we do not want that in our model.  
I will have an unbalanced panel data set because of a few nuances. The 2002-
2004 Charlotte Hornets did not exist as they were relocated to New Orleans, in order to 
replace their leaving team. This left a gap in data for these two years, however, the team 
was reinstituted in the 2004-05 season and continued from there. This gives them 18 
years of data, as opposed to 20 years. The New Orleans Pelicans are also victims of 
having less than 20 seasons of data. They began as an organization in 2002 when the 
Charlotte team relocated to New Orleans, so New Orleans seasons began in 2002, giving 
them a 13-year data set, as opposed to 20 years. These are the only instances of 
unbalanced data, as the next nearest (almost) issue was the creation of the Toronto 
Raptors in 1995, which was the first season of my data, thus avoiding that issue. Teams 
have relocated or changed their names, but if they had the same player base, I continued 
to use them in my data set. For example, the Memphis Grizzlies were once the 
Vancouver Grizzles, however, the relocation didn’t change the players on the team or any 
other circumstances other than venue. The same case applies to the Seattle Supersonics 
	 30	
turning into the Oklahoma City Thunder, and the New Jersey Nets turning into the 
Brooklyn Nets.  
 
7. Results and Discussion 
The results from the four models are seen in table 1. Model 1 was the only model 
that had fixed effects, with the remaining being random. We saw that Lockout1 and 
Lockout2 had large effects on performance, which is intuitive, given the smaller number 
of games in each of those seasons. Salary dispersion showed significance up to 99% on 
the final score metric, however, the coefficient was incredibly small. This is measured in 
dollar figures however, and because we are dealing with millions of dollars, this small 
coefficient still tells a story. It says that for every 1 dollar added to dispersion, there is a 
.00000328	increase	in	the	performance	value.	If	we	extrapolate	this	to	millions,	we	see	that	for	every	addition	million	dollars	we	see	an	increase	in	3.28	for	performance.	Therefore, this model supports the tournament theory, agreeing with 
Lazear and Rosen (1981), Rosen (1986), and Ramaswamy and Rowthhorn (1991). This is 
a large finding, as GMs can use this data moving forward, in order to more efficiently 
build their rosters.  
Model 2 used the log of salary dispersion as an independent variable, instead of 
regular salary dispersion. LN salary dispersion showed significance up to 99%, with a 
coefficient of 12.184. This indicates that for every 1 percentage point increase in salary 
dispersion, there is a 12% increase on the final score variable. This is an incredibly high 
coefficient and I’m curious to see if it holds true. Lockout1 and Lockout2 had similar 
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effects as they did in Model 1. The constant in this model was negative and significant. 
This furthers the support of the tournament theory.  
Model 3 introduces salary cap into the independent variables in an effort to see if 
that has an effect on team performance. The coefficient of salary dispersion was very 
small again, and also significant. Lockout 1 and 2 had negative effects on performance 
again, similar to the previous two models. Salary cap has an incredibly small negative 
coefficient and was significant. This is the opposite of my expectations for the variable, 
because I thought that an increasing salary cap would give teams more flexibility to 
change their rosters, therefore increasing performance. It is found in fact that the extra 
salary has a negative effect on performance. This might be because of the ability of teams 
to raise the price on a free agent player through bidding, thus artificially increasing their 
value, resulting in a large contract player not adding high levels of productivity. This 
makes sense, as we see through the increases in salary, that players are getting paid way 
more than their market value in an effort for teams to stay in contention. Sometimes 
teams consider themselves one piece away from winning a championship and if that 
piece is available, teams will more often than not pay large sums of money to acquire that 
player, even if they don’t add incredible value to the franchise.  
Model 4 used the log of salary dispersion with the salary cap variable included as 
well. LN salary dispersion’s coefficient was a whopping 20, indicating for every 1% 
increase in salary dispersion, there was an 20% increase in wins. This seems like an 
unrealistic value, however, these were the coefficients that I received from my 
regressions. This model heavily supports tournament theory, and almost suggests that it 
should be the “golden rule” for teams to follow if they wish to maximize performance.  
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No Multicolinearity was found in any of the four models. The VIF for each 
independent variable was less than 5 across all four models, as seen in Table 2. The 
closest to a VIF of 5 that any of our models’ variables got to, was 1.76 between final 
score and salary cap in Model 4.  
Graph 1 shows the strong correlation between salary dispersion and finals score.  
Graph 2 shows another strong correlation between the log of salary dispersion and score. 
With these two graphs, we can visually see the effect of salary dispersion on performance 
in the NBA.  Graph 3 looks at the relationship between salary dispersion and 
performance for the Cleveland Cavaliers from 1995-2015. This team currently has a “big 
3”, while it was a relatively compact salary structure in the late 90s and early 2000s. This 
franchise can be used as an example of the relationship between payroll structure and 
performance in the NBA. As we see, there is a correlation between the two variables, as a 
greater salary disparity will influence wins in a positive manner. This is explained by the 
three stars that absorb over 70% of the Cavs’ cap space. LeBron James, Kyrie Irving, and 
Kevin Love all have multiple all star appearances and are considered to be a super team, 
hence the high salary disparity and excelling performance. This franchise structure 
heavily supports the tournament theory as the Cavs role players are signed to cheap 
contracts, yet produce powerfully in an attempt to reach the stardom of their big 3 
teammates.  
My findings from all four of my models support the tournament theory. Every one 
of my dispersion independent variables proved significant to the 99th percentile and 
showed a large influence on team performance in the NBA. Cohesion theory seems to be 
more applicable in the common workforce based on aforementioned literature in this 
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paper; however, tournament theory seems to work hand in hand with basketball in 
particular. We can conclude that this is inherent to basketball predominantly because of 
the rules of the game. In basketball, individual players have much more effect on 
performance than in other sports, and in other industries. Small start-ups can be carried 
by a few individuals to a certain point, but eventually other contributors become 
important to succeed. In the NBA, certain superstars truly can carry their teams to 
contention, especially if the team has 2 or 3 stars. Role players always serve their purpose 
and are important, but not nearly as significant than in other sports. LeBron James has 
been to seven straight NBA Finals, on two separate teams. He has had good teammates 
and other stars, however, his teams have always had a large salary dispersion, given the 
high level of salary allocated to LeBron and his 1-2 co-stars. Nevertheless, his teams are 
constantly successful because of his influence. Every player in the NBA wants to be 
LeBron, as he is considered the best player since Michael Jordan, as well as the numerous 
lucrative sponsorships he has, including a billion dollar lifetime deal with Nike. Rookies 
from all over the country put in work on their game in an effort to reach the 
transcendence that LeBron has reached. The tournament theory supports NBA 
productivity because of superstars taking up large portions of any given salary cap, as 
well as the drive of younger and less successful players trying to reach the top, thus 






1. Dependent	Variable:	Final	Score			 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4	Salary	Dispersion		 .00000328***	(.000000548)	 	 .00000611***	(.000000621)	 	LN	Salary	Dispersion		 	 12.184***	(1.735)	 	 20.051***	(2.113)	Lockout1		 -11.459***	(3.772)	 -10.195**	(4.100)	 -15.839***	(4.063)	 -15.737***	(4.083)	Lockout2		 -10.059***	(3.672)	 -10.608***	(3.991)	 -7.119*	(3.904)	 -6.883*	3.923	Salary	Cap		 	 	 -.000000455***	(.0000000775)	 -.000000503***	(.0000000815)	Constant	 35.334***	2.281	 -135.508***	(26.156)	 45.939***	(3.208)	 -230.224	(29.686)	𝑅6		 .1099	 .097	 .158		 .150	N		 621	 621	 621	 621	Fixed	Effects		 Yes	 No	 No	 No	
All standard errors are in parentheses 
* indicates significance at 10% level of significance 
** indicates significance at 5% level of significance 
*** indicates significance at 1% level of significance 
 
2(a). Model 1 Multicollinearity Test  
Variable	 VIF	 1/VIF	Salary	Dispersion	 1.03	 0.967	Lockout1	 1.03	 0.973	Lockout2	 1.01	 0.990	Mean	VIF	 1.02	 					
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Final Score vs. LN Standard Deviation (LN Salary Dispersion) 
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